Government Regulation No. 28 of 2024 (“GR No. 28”) was issued on July 26, 2024, to implement Law No. 17 of 2023 on Health (the “Omnibus Health Law”). GR No. 28 contains extensive provisions on tobacco products and electronic cigarettes in an effort to reduce the health risks associated with addictive substances, decrease the prevalence of smokers, and prevent the initiation of smoking among beginners in Indonesia. The Indonesian FDA (known as “BPOM”) is working to implement the relevant provisions in GR No. 28 and has subsequently issued a draft regulation on the control and distribution of tobacco products and electronic cigarettes. This draft regulation is set to replace current BPOM Regulation No. 41 of 2013, which only covered tobacco products. The new draft regulation, however, also incorporates rules on electronic cigarettes. This article outlines some of the measures on electronic cigarettes contained in GR No. 28 and the draft implementing regulation, focusing particularly on testing and reporting requirements, sale and pack size requirements, and labeling and advertising requirements. Testing and Reporting The draft regulation requires that each variant of electronic cigarettes produced or imported be tested for nicotine content. These tests must be conducted in an accredited laboratory, and the results must be reported to BPOM. The use of additive materials is prohibited unless they have been proven safe for public health. To enforce this, electronic cigarettes must be tested for the presence of prohibited additives before they are distributed. Additionally, a verification of the content of prohibited additives must be conducted during the distribution period, with the testing and verification being carried out in different laboratories. The results of both tests (i.e., the pre-distribution test and the subsequent verification) must be reported to BPOM. Sale and Pack Size GR No. 28 prohibits the sale of electronic cigarettes:

As in many other countries, registered trademarks in Indonesia that are not used for a given period of time can be canceled. A recent decision (Decision No. 144/PUU-XXI/2023) from the country’s Constitutional Court has extended the non-use cancellation period from three years to five years, applicable from July 30, 2024. This ruling could have a major impact on trademark holders in the country. Background of the Case Article 74 of Indonesia’s Trademark Law of 2016 specifies that trademarks can be canceled if they go unused in the trade of goods or services for three consecutive years from the date of registration or last use. This provision is aligned with the Paris Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. On October 27, 2023, an Indonesian individual named Ricky Thio asked the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of Article 74, arguing that it opened a pathway for third parties to eliminate trademarks owned by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and did not provide certainty to his registered trademark in terms of the period of protection. Additionally, he argued that the period of three consecutive years was burdensome for SMEs, and asked the court to void Article 74 and add force majeure circumstances—such as Covid-19—as an exemption to non-use cancellation. Mr. Thio submitted this request while he was defending his trademark registration from a non-use cancellation request filed by Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd. In his defense to that cancellation request, Mr. Thio explained that the non-use of the trademark was due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The cancellation case followed a different judicial pathway, and was under appeal before the Supreme Court at the time Mr. Thio filed his request for judicial review with the Constitutional Court. Mr. Thio’s case also attracted the submission of an amicus brief—a relatively new trend in Indonesia—from

The rapid development and deployment of artificial intelligence in various industries is increasingly attracting the attention of regulators, who aim to encourage the progression of AI technologies while ensuring their responsible use. Recent regulatory developments around the world, including in the European Union and Southeast Asia, serve as evidence of this emerging trend. Here we shall discuss the effect of AI regulatory approaches in the  EU on Southeast Asian countries. Approach and Action The EU Artificial Intelligence Act has been officially adopted by EU colegislators and will enter into force 20 days after its publication in the EU Official Journal.[1] Most of its provisions will apply two years after its entry into force. The act establishes a harmonized EU legal framework, aiming at ensuring that AI systems placed on and utilized in the EU market are safe, have managed risks, and are aligned with EU fundamental rights and values. Countries in Southeast Asia, predominantly governed by civil law systems, often adopt statutory frameworks similar to those in the EU when addressing new legal matters. In the rapidly developing field of AI, Southeast Asian countries are adopting a wait-andsee approach toward global regulatory trends. This cautious stance allows them to observe and analyze international developments in AI regulation before crafting their own frameworks. Compared to the EU, countries in Southeast Asia are generally more focused on using AI for national development. Common themes include building human resource capability, developing ecosystems and building infrastructure. Some countries emphasize governance and ethics more than others. Over the past five years, governments across Southeast Asia have been focusing on promoting AI by implementing national policies to strengthen AI promotion and governance. While there may be less regional integration in the approach to AI of countries in Southeast Asia, there are some efforts to create

“Forced labor” has many incarnations. Some forms are shocking, such as a case in 2021 where Vietnamese guest workers were brought to a Chinese-owned factory in Serbia that manufactured tires sold to European car companies. The guest workers allegedly had their passports taken away and were subjected to horrible living conditions, including a lack of food, forcing them to resort to hunting small animals in the nearby forest to survive. However, forced labor more often takes subtler forms, so that most people do not even recognize it as such. For example, a factory may receive an order with an extremely short production deadline, and the workers are instructed to work overtime hours. If the employees refuse to do so and stop working when their regular shift ends, they receive warning letters the next day. While less shocking than the situation of the guest workers forced to hunt squirrels to survive, it is also forced labor. ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor defines forced labor as “all work or service…extracted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered…[them]self voluntarily.” The ILO names 11 indicators of forced labor: abuse of vulnerability, deception; restriction of movement, isolation, physical/sexual violence, intimidation and threats, retention of identity documents, withholding of wages, debt bondage, abusive working or living conditions, and excessive overtime. Excessive overtime in particular is common in the manufacturing sector in Southeast Asia, and debt bondage is also prevalent. Some companies demand employees provide a “training deposit” when they commence their employment, which they will have repaid provided they continue working for a minimum period. However, these common practices may soon be eradicated due to new supply chain due diligence legislation. Two such examples demonstrating this greater focus on forced labor within